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13 Externalism, metasemantic contextualism,
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Henry Jackman
Introduction
This chapter examines some of the interactions between holism,
contextualism, and externalism, and will argue that an externalist meta-
semantics that grounds itself in certain plausible assumptions about self-
knowledge will also be a contextualist metasemantics, and that such a
contextualist metasemantics in turn resolves one of the best known
problems externalist theories purportedly have with self-knowledge,
namely the problem of how the possibility of various sorts of ‘switching’
cases can appear to undermine the ‘transparency’ of our thoughts
(in particular, our ability to tell, with respect to any two occurrent
thoughts, whether they exercise the same or different concepts).
Metasematics, self-interpretation, and contextualism
Philosophers of language can be understood as offering two sorts of
semantic theory. On the one hand, they can present an account of what
the semantic values of the words in our language are and how the values of
complex expressions are a function of the semantic values of their parts
(what we can simply call a semantic theory). On the other hand, they can
present an account of how our words came to get those particular seman-
tic values (what we can call a metasemantic theory).1 Often, they will
present theories of both sorts.
Thanks to Anne Bezuidenhout, Sanford Goldberg. Michael Lynch, Mark McCullaugh,
Ram Neta, and Arthur Zucker (as well as audiences in Toronto, Chicago, New Orleans,
Barcelona, Lisbon, Paris, and Athens (Ohio)) for comments on earlier versions of this
chapter.
1 Davies (2006) also describes the distinction in these terms, though it is described else-
where as the distinction between “Descriptive” and “Foundational” semantics (Stalnaker
1997, 1999), “Formal” and “Philosophical” semantics (Brandom 1994), “semantic the-
ories” and “foundational theories of meaning” (Speaks 2011), semantics in the “lin-
guist’s” and the “metaphysical” sense (Block 1998), and “formal semantics” and
“Philosophical Meaning Theory” (Glüer 2011, 2012).
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For instance, within the broadly ‘Davidsonian’ framework presup-
posed here one’s semantic theory (his “truth theory”) understands mean-
ing in terms of truth and satisfaction,2 with, say, “Chicago” being satisﬁed
by Chicago and “city” being satisﬁed by members of the set of cities, and
“Chicago is a city” will be true if the object that satisﬁes the ﬁrst term is
among the set of objects that satisﬁes the second. In contrast to this
‘atomistic’ semantic theory, Davidson’s metasemantics (which takes the
form of his “theory of interpretation”) is unapologetically holistic, with
the ultimate explanation of how each word gets its meaning being depen-
dent on how other terms in the language get theirs.3 The Davidsonian
understands the satisfaction conditions of any word in a speaker’s lan-
guage as determined by the set of assignments that would maximize the
truth of all of that speaker’s commitments.4
Davidson isn’t always clear about why one’s metasemantics should
maximize the amount of truth that the subject believes,5 but I think that
suchmaximization can bemotivated in terms of what will here be referred
to as the “Self-Interpretation Principle,” namely, when faced with con-
ﬂicting commitments on an agent’s part, we should assign semantic
values to his or her words in a way that preserves the truth of the
commitments that he or she would hold on to were he or she aware of
the tension.6 So, to take an example from Burge that we will return to
later, if a speaker believes both that, say, (1) he has “arthritis” in his thigh,
and (2) doctors study how to treat “arthritis” in medical school, then
whether his “arthritis” utterances refer to arthritis or tharthritis (the latter
picking out a larger set of ailments including both arthritis and similar
pains occurring beyond one’s joints) will be determined by which of
these two he would treat as mistaken were he made aware of the conﬂict.7
2 See, for instance, Davidson 1965/1984, 1967/1984.
3 See, for instance, Davidson 1973/1984, 1974/1984, 1975/1984, 1977/1984, 1979/1984,
1986a.
4 This is usually explained in terms of the Davidsonian’s commitment to the ‘Principle of
Charity’. For a more complete discussion of this, see Jackman 2003.
5 Davidson argues that “if we want to understand others, we must count them right in most
matters” (Davidson 1974/1984, p. 197), but this only requires that beliefs bemostly true, it
doesn’t explain why maximization is required, that is, why, when faced with two inter-
pretations according to which the subject’s beliefs are mostly true, we should pick the
interpretation that attributes to him or her the most true beliefs.
6 For a more extensive discussion of Davidson’s conception of the Principle of Charity, and
how it relates to what this self-interpretation principle, see Jackman 2003.
7 See Burge 1979. We are assuming for the sake of argument that the rest of his ‘arthritis’
beliefs were true of both arthritis and tharthritis, and that “treating as a mistake” is more
substantial than simply giving up the practice of asserting the sentence. One could ‘give
up’ one of the beliefs that one had arthritis in one’s thigh because one wanted to bring
one’s usage into line with one’s community without thinking that the original belief was
false (just as I might “give up”my belief that someone moving from the United Kingdom
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The Self-Interpretation Principle thus leads to a type of truth maximiza-
tion and motivates it in terms of a form of self-knowledge that is under-
written by the fact that it is precisely the agent’s point of view that we are
trying to capture in interpretation. It leads to a type of maximization
frequently associated with the Principle of Charity because it has always
been assumed that what is to be maximized is not just the total number of
true beliefs, but rather some weighted total of them.8 Some beliefs will be
more important to the speaker than others, and preserving the truth of
these beliefs may have a higher priority than preserving the truth of
multiple beliefs that are assigned less weight. It is precisely such weighing
that would be revealed in the way the speakers revise their beliefs when
conﬂicts becomemanifest,9 and so assigning truth to the belief(s) that are
preserved through such conﬂicts maximizes the (weighted) amount of
truths the subject believes.
A holistic metasemantics that draws on the Self-Interpretation
Principle can be shown to both leave meaning comparatively stable, and
be compatible with semantic externalism,10 and it will be argued here is
that it also underwrites a type of contextualism that is given less emphasis in
the literature than it could. In particular, if the function which maximizes
the number of truths believed by the speaker works on weighted totals
governed by something like the Self-Interpretation Principle, then we can
account for some contextual variations in the semantic values of our
words in terms of the fact that how much weight a particular belief has
can vary from context to context.11
to the United States might “give up” his practice of referring to what American’s call
“cookies” as “biscuits” in order to be better understood in his new environment without
thinking that any of his previous “that’s a biscuit” utterances were mistaken).
8 For more on the importance of such weighing in understanding anything like Charity as
being remotely plausible, see Glüer 2011, Jackman 2003, Pagin 2006.
9 Subject to some idealization relating to the fact that in practice speakers won’t be aware of
all of the incompatibility relations that exist among their various commitments, and so
may in practice favor belief A over belief B simply because they were unaware that A was
also incompatible with beliefs B and C.
10 For an extended discussion of this, and whether the Self-Interpretation Principle should
be understood as an explication or replacement of the ‘Principle of Charity’, see Jackman
2003.
11 It is important to remember that the type of contextualism defended here is of a metase-
mantic sort. Semantic Contextualism treats the semantic value of a term as itself making
reference to some feature of the context. Indexicals are paradigms of this (“I” means “the
personmaking the utterance”), but accounts of, say, “tall” or “ﬂat” that tie them to ‘hidden
parameters’ (e.g. tall = ‘tall for an f’, where f is determinedby the context) that are implicitly
marked at the level of logical formdo this aswell.MetasemanticContextualism, on the other
hand, simply tells a story about how our terms get their semantic values that suggest that
they may have different semantic values in different contexts (though the resulting seman-
tic values themselves may make no reference to context). Consequently, one should thus
not expect the sorts of syntactic markers associated with more familiar sorts of semantic
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For example, we can see a type of context sensitivity by considering the
following two sentences about a freckle-faced 7-year-old (Frank) who has
just covered his school with grafﬁti.
(1) The principal should call Frank’s mother.
(2) Frank probably gets those freckles from his mother.
Now if Frank is adopted, then (whether the speaker knows about the
adoption or not) the extension of these two instances of “mother” will
probably be different. (Assuming that we are acquainted with Frank but
with neither of his ‘mothers’.) We typically should contact the woman
bringing Frank up if he is in trouble, but assume that the woman who
contributed to his genetic make-up is responsible for his freckles.
Somebody uttering the two sentences may thus refer to two different
groups of people with the word “mother” not because they have added
or lost any ‘mother beliefs’ but because the comparative importance of
those beliefs changes from context to context.
The variance in the semantic value for “mother” can thus be under-
stood as being produced by our various interests resulting in different
‘mother beliefs’ being more-or-less heavily weighed. When I am talking
about Frank’s disciplinary problems, my belief that Frank is being
brought up by his mother will be weighed more heavily than my belief
about his mother contributing to his genetic make-up. When I am talking
about his freckles, the opposite will usually be the case. Different aspects
of our ‘mother prototype’ are given greater weight in the two contexts.
An obvious alternative understanding of such cases would be to explain
them in terms of ambiguity, that is, in terms of their being multiple words
in one’s lexicon that just happen to sound the same. Just as there are two
distinct meanings for “bank,” there would be multiple meanings for
“mother.” However, even if we were to admit that most of us had at
least two separate “mother” entries in our mental lexicon,12 there seem to
contextualism (for some discussion of these, see Stanley 2007) to be found if the con-
textualism involved is at the metasemantic level. Indeed, the contextualism defended here
will be in many respects closer to the ‘cheap’ contextualism defended by Peter Ludlow
(Ludlow 2008), and the view would suggest that the lexicon is ‘dynamic’ in much the way
that he suggests (Ludlow 2008, 2014).
12 And one might doubt whether two would be enough. Cases like the pair of sentences
above could be created to show that “mother” would have to be ambiguous between the
woman bringing up the child, the woman who contributes its genetic material, the
woman who actually gives birth to the child, the woman who provides the egg, etc. We
can certainly creat separate terms to explicitly distinguish birth mothers, biological
mothers, traditional surrogate mothers, adopted mothers, stepmothers, and the rest,
but it is hard to imagine that these are simply labels for separate items that existed in
our mental lexicon as soon as we started talking about “mothers” at all.
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be cases where this sort of response couldn’t be appropriate (as when the
two sentences were uttered by someone brought up in so sheltered an
environment that they hadn’t been aware that the two sorts of mothers
ever came apart, and so had no reason to put two entries for the term in
their mental lexicon). Further, even if one were to think that this sort of
case is best handled by ambiguity, there are others where this seems
harder to do.
For instance, consider a speaker who, when Venus rises at the begin-
ning of the evening, will reliably point to it and say “there is Venus.” He
does the same in the morning, and never ‘misapplies’ the term to any
other star or planet. The putative extension (those items that the term is
actually applied to) of “Venus” in his language consists only of the planet
Venus. However, while the putative extension of Venus in his language is
much like it is in ours (assuming – falsely in my case – that we can identify
Venus in the night sky), the general characterization he associates with the
term is very different. In particular, while we believe that Venus is a lifeless
planet, that we have sent satellites to gather information about it, and so
on, this speaker believes that Venus is the goddess of love, that she is
married to Vulcan, is the lover of Mars, responds to the prayers of her
followers (of whom the speaker is one), and so on.
For such a speaker, there is a serious lack of ﬁt between the general
characterizations associated with “Venus” and what he actually applies
the term to, and we could imagine his background to be shaped in three
different fashions, each of which may lead us to interpret his use of
“Venus” in different ways. If the speaker is a particularly devout worshi-
per, whowas only interested in looking up at the night sky because he took
himself to be viewing the distant goddess herself, then he may be much
more willing to give up everything in the putative extension rather than his
general beliefs. If he is informed that the distant star is a lifeless planet, he
will be inclined, correctly, to think that he misapplied the term “Venus”
every morning and evening when he looked at the sky.13 On the other
hand, if he were not at all devout, and his interest in ‘Venus’was primarily
as a guide to navigation, with the myths just providing interesting back-
ground about the light that happens to guide him, then he might give up
all of his goddess-friendly general beliefs if he found them not to be true of
13 There may be some temptation to treat utterances of his such as “Venus is looking
especially bright tonight” as still being true (provided that the planet is especially bright
on that night), but this may just be because (1) it is true in the sense that my utterance of
“John looks hurt” might be considered true if I mistake Peter for John and Peter looks
hurt, so that the speaker’s reference for such utterances may be Peter or the planet, while
the semantic reference remains John or the Greco-Roman goddess, or (2) one is impli-
citly moving on to a case more like the third type of Greek who shifts from one reference
to the to the other depending upon what is most important to him in various contexts.
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the celestial body he applied the term to, and so his use of “Venus,” even
in sentences like “Venus is a goddess,” would refer exclusively to the
planet. Finally (and this may have put him in the largest group at some
point), hemay be someone in between, whose goddess-friendly beliefs are
more important in some contexts, and whose navigation-friendly beliefs
are more important in others. In this ﬁnal case, it may be that what he
refers to by the term switches form context to context, sometimes picking
out a planet, sometimes a ﬁctional goddess, and so on.14
It should hopefully be clear at this point how this sort of metasemantic
context-shifting is intended to work,15 and it will be argued below that we
see a similar kind of context-shifting in a number of familiar philosophical
thought experiments, and a lack of recognition of the ‘shiftiness’ of these
cases can lead to the intractability of the disputes about what to say about
them.
Metasemantic contextualism, ambiguity, and externalist
intuitions
The literature on semantic externalism is often driven by intuitions about
particular cases (ﬁnding “water” on Twin Earth, Bert’s complaining to
his doctor about his “arthritis”, etc.), but philosophers have never
14 In much the same way, who, if anyone, we refer to by “Moses” may depend upon how
heavily our beliefs are weighed. Someone who is interested in the history of the Middle
East may weigh heavily the belief that Moses led the Israelites out of Egypt, but not put
much weight on beliefs relating to the miracles Moses purportedly performed (even if he
does believe that they were, in fact, performed). On the other hand, someone who is only
interested in the miraculous aspects of the story might weigh the miracles the most
heavily, and if there turns out to be no one who took the tablets containing the Ten
Commandments from God and parted the Red Sea, then his term “Moses” would not
refer to anyone. Finally, someone may be both of these, interested sometimes in history,
and sometimes in miracles, and the reference of the name may shift for him accordingly.
(Whether something like this is whatWittgenstein was getting at when he claimed that “If
one says ‘Moses did not exist’, this maymean various things” (Wittgenstein 1953, §79), is
something that I’ll leave to the reader to decide.)
15 Onemay note similarities here to the view defended in Bilgrami (1992), which also allows
for a type of metasemantic context sensitivity. However, Bilgrami distinguishes ‘aggre-
gate contents’, which capture all of the beliefs an agent associates with a term, from the
more psychologically real ‘local contents’ which are made up a contextually salient subset
of the beliefs in the aggregate contents, and thus vary from context to context. Context
determines not how much weight a particular belief has in determining what we are
referring to, but rather whether the beliefs in question are part of a particular ‘local’
content at all. The ultimate goal of Bilgrami’s theory is precisely not to explain how our
beliefs determine what we refer to, but rather to understand meaning in terms of belief
rather than reference (see especially Bilgrami 1992, pp. 134–35) while preserving the
intuition that meanings can be shared (because, even if the ‘aggregate’ contents are never
shared, the local subsets contextually derived from them can be; for a discussion of this,
see Jackman 2014).
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reached complete agreement about such intuitions, and it has recently
been sugested that nonphilosophical intuitions about such cases are gen-
erally much more variable than most philosophers had originally
assumed.16 That said, if the kind of contextualism outlined above is
right, then the way in which we describe our cases will be very important,
and an intuition about what a word refers to in one case need not entail
that it refers the same way in others. Consequently, what are often
described as “conﬂicting intuitions”may just be intuitions about different
cases that conﬂict when treated as context free judgments about what our
terms refer to, but are perfectly compatible with each other when their
context is made more explicit.
For instance, let us return to Tyler Burge’s discussion of Bert and his
idiosyncratic use of “arthritis.” Bert uses “arthritis”much as the rest of us
do but, notoriously, he also applies “arthritis” to the pains in his thigh.17
Burge treats Bert here as still referring to arthritis by “arthritis,” while
writers such as Davidson and Bilgrami argue that Bert should be under-
stood as referring instead to tharthritis (once again, a condition which
includes both arthritis and similarly painful ailments in the limbs) by
“arthritis.”18 This lack of consensus about what to say about Bert may
reﬂect the fact that what Bert means by “arthritis” varies from context to
context. When Bert goes to the doctor and complains “my arthritis has
spread to my thigh,” it may be correct to take him to be referring to
arthritis by “arthritis.” On the other hand, when he is sitting around with
his brother and complains “my arthritis is too bad for me tomow the lawn
today,” it may be equally correct to treat him as referring to tharthritis.
The sort of metasemantic contextualism outlined above would explain
why the extension of Bert’s term “arthritis”might shift in just this way. In
addition to a large set of beliefs which would be true of both arthritis and
tharthritis, Bert has one set of beliefs (such as “I have arthritis in my thigh”
and “My arthritis kept me from cleaning out the garage last week”) which
would be true only of tharthritis, and another set of beliefs (such as
“Doctors have studied how to treat arthritis” and “The man from the
insurance company said that people with arthritis should go see a doctor
16 See, for instance, Weinberg, Nichols, and Stich 2001; and Machery, Mallon, Nichols,
and Stich 2004.
17 See Burge 1979.
18 Bilgrami 1992; Davidson 1993, 1994. Davidson seems to have reconsidered his views on
the example, though only if Bert “intended his hearers to take the word ‘arthritis’ as
referring, not to what he thought it referred to, but to what it referred to when used by
experts” (Davidson 2003, p. 698). Since this intention is also supposed to be “explicit,”
it’s not clear how close to Burge’s view he actually comes, because Davidson’s require-
ment that this intention be “explicit” seems to suggest a metasemantic understanding of
the example that Burge explicitly rejects (see Burge 1979, pp. 96–97).
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about it”) whichwould be true only of arthritis.When he is complaining to
his brother, the former set of beliefs will be given greater weight than the
latter (and so he will refer to tharthritis), while when he is consulting his
doctor, the latter set of beliefs will be given greater weight (and so he will
refer to arthritis). What Bert means by “arthritis” shifts from context to
context, and such context sensitivity may be characteristic of cases where
someone’s idiosyncratic usage of a word can be understood in terms of
either an idiosyncratic belief or an idiosyncratic semantic value.
It would, then, not be a coincidence that Burge tends to focus on
examples like visits to the doctor’s ofﬁce, while Davidson and Bilgrami
present cases where our interests are less tied to professional standards.
Each presents Bert using of “arthritis” in a context that is friendly to their
views, and then generalizes from that usage to what Bert means by
“arthritis” in a more context-free way.19 Furthermore, conﬂicting intui-
tions about what Bert means may also reﬂect the fact that, if the com-
parative entrenchment of one’s beliefs is part of what determines what
onemeans, then cases like Bert’s use of “arthritis” are underdescribed in a
way that allows different readers of the stories to project their own sense of
which beliefs should be most important on to the characters involved in
them.20 So, for instance, if we are personally disinclined to defer to expert
usage even in situations where that expertise is being relied on, we may
simply project those weightings on to Bert, and so, as Davidson often
does, treat him as meaning tharthritis by “arthritis” even when he is in the
doctor’s ofﬁce.
Much the same sort of move could be made with respect to the some-
times conﬂicting intutions we have about terms like “water.”21 We have
19 Though the fact that Bert would come out as meaning arthritis even in some cases would
be enough to establish anti-individualism, so this sort of contextualism would side more
with Burge than Davidson on the larger issue at hand. Indeed, one could argue that even
in those contexts where we are more inclined to say that Bert means tharthritis, it still may
fail to be the case that that those contents are individuated individualistically. If Bert
wants to get out of mowing the lawn because of the pain in his thigh, but lived in a society
that used “arthritis” to pick out, say, everything philosophers associate with “tharthritis”
except for pain at the base of the spine (call it ‘barthritis’), I’d expect that Bert would be
correctly taken to mean barthritis rather than tharthritis, even if he happened to believe
that one could get ‘arthritis’ at the base of one’s spine. Consequently, even when an
idiosyncratic concept is attributed to Bert, it doesn’t follow that the concept he has is
independent of how the relevant word is used in his society. (For a related discussion of
why nonindividualism holds for speakers who have mastered the concepts in question,
see Burge 1979, pp. 84–85.)
20 See, once again, Jackman 2009.
21 Though I think that the intuitions are less often in conﬂict for philosophers like myself
who have had the importance of “water” being a natural kind term drilled into us since
the beginning of our undergraduate education. The variance would be even more
pronounced when one considers the use of the term before the discovery of modern
chemistry.
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many commitments that focus on water as a functional kind, and others
that focus on it as a natural kind, and while we often presume these kinds
to be co-extensive, the two would come into conﬂict if we were ever in a
scenario like Putnam’s Twin Earth case, in which we were confronted
with a substance that had all of water’s perceptual/functional properties
(its appearance, its taste, its ability to sustain life, etc.) while having a
different chemical structure. Which commitments will be weighted most
heavily, and so whether “water” picks out a natural or functional kind,
could vary from person to person, and with certain individuals, from
context to context. Indeed, this seems to be compatible with Putnam’s
own analysis of the extension of “water”:
We can understand the relation sameL (same liquid as) as a cross-world relation
by understanding it so that a liquid in W1 [World 1] which has the same
important physical properties (in W1) that a liquid in W2 possesses (in W2)
bears the sameL to the latter liquid . . . an entity x, in an arbitrary possible world,
is water if and only if it bears the relation sameL (construed as a cross-world
relation) to the stuff we call ‘water’ in the actual world. (Putnam 1975, p. 232;
boldface mine)
Putnam claims that the ‘hidden structures’ determine the reference of
natural kind terms not because only such hidden structures could serve in
the same-kind relation, but rather because “normally the ‘important’
properties of a liquid or a solid, etc., are the one’s that are structurally
important.”However, importance is, as Putnam himself goes on to stress,
“an interest relative notion” (ibid., p. 239), and in some contexts the
more functional properties associated with “water” may be more impor-
tant to us than its microphysical ones.22 In such contexts, it may be that
the term is best seen as picking out the functional kind. Furthermore,
when conversing with others, or when reading a philosopher’s paper on
the subject, we might not intially have a strong preference between the
commitments tying to each of the two readings, and thus be willing to
favor one set over another simply to ‘accommodate’ our conversational
partners.23
This ‘pluralistic’ attitude toward the apparently conﬂicting intuitions
outlined above bears some similarities to a view currently being pro-
posed by Shaun Nichols, Ángel Pinillos, and Ron Mallon, who also
22 This is certainly downplayed in Putnam 1975, but a sensitivity to howwe can still feel the
pull of the nonnatural kind reading in such cases is more evident in Putnam 1962. (For a
discussion of Putnam’s ‘hardening of heart’ on this issue, see Unger 1982, p. 165; Unger
1984 p. 124).
23 This seems to be the understanding of such cases in Lewis 1999, pp. 313–14.
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stress how our judgments about the standard externalist thought experi-
ments are much more variable than many philosophers assumed.24
However, they suggest that the variance between intuitions about
what to say about various thought experiments in the philosophy of
language should be explained by something closer to full-scale ambi-
guity. As they put it:
We will argue that natural kind terms are ambiguous. In some cases, the
reference of a token is ﬁxed by a causal-historical convention; in other cases,
the reference of a token of the same type is ﬁxed by a descriptivist convention.
We call this an ambiguity theory because the idea is that there are two conven-
tions that determine the reference of natural kind terms . . . (Nichols, Pinillos and
Mallon 2014, p. 7 )
While the authors take the ambiguity in question to be less extreme than
the sort we see with, say, “bank,”25 where the two semantic values are
unrelated, it still seems that the ambiguity they have in mind is consider-
ablymore substantial than the sort of context sensitivity defended here. In
particular, they suggests that there are two completely different ways
(“two conventions”) in which the referents of our terms can be deter-
mined. As they put it, their claim that natural kind terms are system-
atically ambiguous between descriptive and nondescriptive conventions
runs against a “critical constraint on theory building in the philosophy of
language,” namely that “only one theory of reference will apply to a class
of terms.”26
Now the contextualist account above is not only one that respects this
“critical constraint” by proposing a “univocal theory of reference”27 (the
same function from use to meaning would determine what, say,
“Arthritis” refers to in both cases, its just that the weighting of the inputs
to the function changes), but it is also one that allows a good deal more
ﬂexibility than one that took reference to simply be ambiguous between
causal and descriptive notions. In particular, taking our terms to be
ambiguous between the ‘causal’ and ‘descriptive’ meanings doesn’t help
account for contextual shifts in which both meanings seem to fall within
the range of the causal. In short, the contextualist account can, in princi-
ple, explain all the cases appealed to by the ambiguity theory, and others
24 Nichols, Pinillos and Mallon (2014). The authors also make the suggestion that philo-
sophers tend to cherry pick their examples to favor those which produce intuitions
favoring their preferred theory (see ibid., p. 10).
25 Ibid., p. 26. Indeed, they also appeal to Lewis 1999 (see note 21), but they seem to treat
the “accommodation” involved as deciding which of the two referential conventions to
follow, rather than involving which of the commitments associated with a word should be
given more stress (Nichols, Pinillos and Mallon 2014, p. 24).
26 Nichols, Pinillos and Mallon 2014, pp. 22–23. 27 Ibid., p. 19.
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besides, so it is unclear what advantage positing the more substantial
ambiguity to explain for such cases would bring.28
‘Switching’ cases
Cases of contextual variation that can’t be explained in terms of a simple
ambiguity between ‘causal’ and ‘descriptive’ conventions arise when the
source of information associated with a word that the subject is causally
connected to ‘switches’. We will focus on three such cases here.
Donnellan and Evans on proper names
An example of this sort can be seen in the contrasting views of Evans and
Donnellan about how to understand the reference of a proper name when
the source of the information associated with it changes over time.
Donnellan allows that the reference of such names can vary from context
to context, while Evans favors a more invariant account. I’m largely
sympathetic with the general shape of Evans’s theory, but he mischar-
acterizes Donnellan’s position in a way that keeps him from seeing how
his own view could be developed. In particular, Evans takes Donnellan to
argue for something like what I’ll call “source-dependent contextualism,”
which is roughly, the view that a token of a name in a claim refers to
whichever potential bearer was the source of the information that is the
topic of that claim.
For the source-dependent contextualist, if our beliefs about
“Napoleon” actually came from two men, one of whom (“Alpha”) was
the source of all of our pre-1814 information associated with
“Napoleon,” and another (“Beta”) of whom took the original’s place
and was the source of the rest of our information, then claims about
“Napoleon’s” early life or the 1812 invasion of Russia would refer to
Alpha, while claims about “Napoleon’s” defeat at Waterloo or his even-
tual death on the island of Saint Helena would refer to Beta. By contrast,
Evans argues as follows:
I think that we can say that in general a speaker intends to refer to the item that is
the dominant source of his associated body of information. It is important to see
28 The contextualist account also explains the fact (discussed ibid., p. 20) that many
questions elicit a type of ‘neutral’ reaction rather than showing a response that clearly
favors either the causal or descriptive reading. The ambiguity view might suggest that we
could toggle between these two distinct sets of conventions, but the contextualist view
suggests that wemay face cases where the incompatible beliefs are equally weighted (or in
which we have no idea what weight they have) and so have no ﬁrm idea of what is being
referred to.
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that this will not change from occasion to occasion depending upon the subject
matter. Some have proposed [Donnellan 1970 is cited at this point] that if in the
case [above] the historian says “Napoleon fought skillfully at Waterloo” it is the
imposter Beta who is the intended referent, while if he had said in the next breath
‘. . . unlike his performance in the Senate’ it would be Alpha. This seems a
mistake; not only was what the man said false, what he intended to say was false
too, as he would be the ﬁrst to agree; it wasn’t Napoleon who fought skillfully at
Waterloo.29
Evans doesn’t think that the reference of “Napoleon” shifts from context
to context, but while he is correct to claim that Donnellan does allow for
contextual variation, he doesn’t present a charitable, or accurate, reading
of the sort of variation that Donnellan makes room for. Indeed,
Donnellan’s claims about what we would be referring to in various situa-
tions seem to be a better ﬁt with the type of contextualism defended here,
than they do with the position Evan’s attributes to him.30
We can see this by reconsidering the primary example from the paper of
Donnellan’s that Evans cites. In “Proper Names and Identifying
Descriptions,” Donnellan asks us to imagine that a student attending a
party “meets a man he takes to be the famous philosopher, J. L. Aston-
Martin.”31 The student has previously read a number of Aston-Martin’s
papers and spends an hour or so speaking with the man (but not about
philosophy) over the course of the evening. Donnellan claims that if the
student goes back to his seminar the next day and tells everyone “Last
night I met J. L. Aston Martin and talked to him for almost an hour,” he
would have said something false, since the name refers to the philosopher,
and not the man a the party.32 On the other hand, if he is telling some
other friends about the party and the amusing things that happened, such
as when “Robinson tripped over Aston-Martin’s feet and fell ﬂat on his
face,” the name would refer to the person at the party, not the famous
philosopher.33
First of all, one should note that on the account attributed toDonnellan
by Evans, both of these utterances of “Aston-Martin”would have referred
to the man at the party (while it would refer to the philosopher when the
student said things like “J. L. Aston-Martin wrote ‘Other bodies’”), while
in Donnellan’s own discussion the referent of the name isn’t identiﬁed
with the source of the particular belief that is forgrounded in the utter-
ance. Instead, Donnellan tentatively explains the difference in who the
name refers to in the two cases as follows:
29 Evans 1973, pp. 16–17.
30 For a more sympathetic reading of what is motivating Donnellan here that meshes with
much of this, see Stalnaker 2008 (especially pp. 124–25).
31 Donnellan 1970, p. 68. 32 Ibid., pp. 68–69. 33 Ibid., p. 69.
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Perhaps the difference lies in the fact that the initial utterance of the speaker’s
remark would only have a point if he was referring to the famous philosopher,
while in the later utterances it is more natural to take him to be referring to the
man at the party, since what happened there is the whole point.34
The referent of a name may switch from context to context because
different sources of information can, in Evans’s terms, ‘dominate’ the
total “body of information” associated with the name, and this domina-
tion may vary depending on what the point of a particular utterance is.
Chances are that piece of information will bear greater weight than usual
if it is the topic of the utterance, but this alone would not guarantee that
other information associated with a name might carry still greater weight.
If there are two sources of information associated with a name, one of
which accounts for the great majority of the beliefs involved, it is quite
likely that one will be ‘dominant’ even in cases where the sentence topic is
something tied to the other (as in Evan’s “Napoleon” case). By contrast, if
the amount of information is more evenly split, then the ‘dominant’
source may often vary from context to context. Still, even if things are
generally weighted heavily one way, what becomes dominant can switch.
For instance, in a note to the passage quoted above, Donnellan considers
a case where the student becomes good friends with the “Aston-Martin”
hemeets at the party, and stays so formany years without ever discovering
that he is mistaken about his friend’s philosophical production. In such
cases, most of the speaker’s “Aston-Martin” utterances will refer to his
new friend, since information from the party-going Aston-Martin would
typically dominate the rest, but if he claimed to know J. L. Aston-Martin
“in circumstances where it is clear that the point of the remark has to do
with claiming to know a famous man,” Donnellan still thinks that “we
would suppose him to have referred to Aston-Martin, the famous philo-
sopher, and not to [the] man he met at the party, who later is one of his
close acquaintances.”35
Such shifts could not, of course, be explained in terms of the meaning
of proper names being ‘ambiguous’ between a ‘causal’ and a ‘descriptive’
reading, since both interpretations of the name are equally causal. The
use of “Aston-Martin” to pick out the famous philosopher rather than the
party-goer isn’t purely “descriptive,” as should be clear when we consider
the possibility that the famous Aston-Martin fabricated much of his back
story and achieved his fame by taking credit for the work of one is his more
retiring colleaugues (and so never wrote “Other Bodies” or any of the
other papers attributed to him).36 There might, of course, be contexts in
which the term is used in ways thatmake writing the papersmore essential
34 Ibid. 35 Ibid., p. 79. 36 See the discussion of “Gödel” in Kripke 1972/1980.
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(as when a student is writing his dissertation on “Other Bodies” but cares
little about the biography of the author), but that wouldn’t be one of the
contexts that Donnellan describes, where the “famous philosopher” and
the “party-goer” are the two subjects.
Memory content
The account sketched above also applies usefully to the problem of how to
ascribe thought (and memory) content in cases such as the following:37
John is, at the age of 12, transported from Earth to Twin Earth (which is,
once again, just like Earth but whose ‘water’ is made up of XYZ (twater)
rather than H2O) and he lives there for another forty years without being
aware of the switch.38 Most externalists agree that at age 12, John’s use of
“water” refers to H2O but at some time over the next few years his term
comes to pick out (or at least typically pick out) XYZ, so that when he asks
for a glass of “water” he is talking about twater, and no longer talking
about water. There is, however, less consensus about whether John has
(1) simply acquired a second ‘water’ concept, so that he is able to have
thoughts about both water and twater (the pluralistic, or “conceptual
addition,” view),39 or (2) had his original water concept replaced by a
twater concept, so that he is now unable to have any water thoughts (the
monistic, or “conceptual replacement,” view).40
The difference between the pluralistic and monistic views manifests
itself whenwe try to interpret claims/thoughts of John’s (at age 52) such as
“I remember swimming in Lake Ontario when I was 11 and thinking ‘this
water was freezing!’” Defenders of the monistic view typically claim that
in such attributions “water” picks out twater and that John has simply lost
the ability to remember what he thought before. Defenders of the plur-
alistic view, on the other hand, may treat this as one of the cases where
John was able to apply his original water concept, so that the recollection
turns out to be a true one. Monists view even memory content to be
determined by one’s current environment, while pluralists typically treat
37 Such cases of ‘slow switching’ became familiar through Burge 1988 and Boghossian
1989. For a summary of some of the discussion of such cases, see Parent 2013.
38 This is themost familiar version of the case, but the problem can be generated around less
far-fetched examples such as someone making a permanent move from Great Britain to
the United States without realizing that the term “Robin” picks out different birds in the
two dialects of English, and unable to tell the two sorts of bird apart.
39 See, for instance, Boghossian 1989, 1992a, 2011; Burge 1988; Gibbons 1996; Heal
1988.
40 See, for instance, Bernecker 2010; Brueckner 1997; Ludlow 1995, 1996, and 1999; Tye
1998.
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memory content as reﬂecting the environment in which the thought
remembered originally occurred.
The view defended here is clearly more pluralistic than monistic.
However, it is in a position to allow that the monist may often be right
about what we should say about particular memories. The contextualist
view allows that there are a variety of ‘water’ concepts available to the
speaker in the switching cases, and which one, say, John applies will
depend upon his interests at the time. At 52, John typically refers to twater
by “water” since most of his ‘water’ beliefs are tied to his contact with
XYZ.However, if the purpose of his recollection were simply to reﬂect on
his youth, most of these later water beliefs may not be relevant, while the
belief that he did, in fact, experience the freezing water would be very
heavily weighed. In such a case, he would plausibly be seen as thinking
about water rather than twater.
On the other hand, if the recollection comes up in the context of
debating whether a spot he and his family are about to visit (and which
he thinks he once swam in) will be pleasant to swim in, then non water-
friendly beliefs of his such as “there is a Great Lake full of water to the
north of me that I’m thinking of vacationing at,” “my children always
complain when they have to swim in cold water,” and so on, will be
heavily weighed, and the suggestion that he refers to twater by the term41
(and thus misremembers what he originally thought) will seem much
more plausible.
Whether a speaker’s use of “water” in a memory claim refers to H2O
or XYZ will depend at least partially on his context, and not simply on
the source of the particular memory claim. In those contexts where his
commitments associated with his original environment have more
weight, it will refer to water while in those where those relating to his
new environment have more weight, it will refer to twater. Of course, as
the speaker spends more time on Twin Earth, the number and strength
of his twater commitments is bound to grow, but the water commitments
don’t simply disappear, and in some (increasingly rare) contexts they
may be important enough to outweigh the more recent twater
commitments.42
There may also, of course, be contexts where “water” referred to a
more ‘functional’ kind that picked out both H20 and XYZ. In such
41 Or perhaps a functional kind that picks out both H2O and XYZ (see below).
42 So, this would follow Heal in suggesting that the switch to the new contents would never
be ‘complete’. The original substance would be what was referred to not just because
those instances of a kind that “would be the ﬁrst to come to mind” in the context (Heal
1998, p. 105), but also because they would be the ones the speaker took to be most
important for the point he was trying to make if questioned.
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contexts, the commitments to applications on both planets would each
be more heavily weighted by the speaker than any commitments to his
using the term in just the way his peers do,43 or to the term picking out a
natural kind (as, perhaps, when the speaker insists that “Ever since I was
7, I’ve felt ‘off’ all day if I don’t start the morning by splashing cold water
on my face”).44
Pluralistic accounts of switching cases are sometimes criticized for not
suggesting any sort of “mechanism” that would determine which contents
occurred in which contexts.45 Monistic accounts have no such require-
ment, but the sort of contextualist account suggested above has no
trouble with this extra explanatory burden. The Self-Interpretation
Principle provides an explanation of why and when the contents switch,
and it does so in a way that keeps self-knowledge centrally located in our
account of such contents.46 Of course what I described earlier as “source-
dependent contextualism,” the view that would simply tie the content of
“water” in a memory claim to whatever substance was the source of that
particular ‘water’ memory, also provides a mechanism for determining
which contents appear in which contexts,47 but that view not only makes
unintuitive claims about just what the content of ourmemories must be in
certain contexts (see the discussion of Evans and Donnellan above), but,
as we shall see in the following section, it also leads to some serious
tensions with some natural assumptions about self-knowledge.
43 Especially since, given that the functional kind includes all of the instances of the natural
kind they are talking about, his meaning something different than they do doesn’t
necessarily prevent them from being legitimate sources of testimonial knowledge for him.
44 Once again, given the multiplicity of possibly readings, these switches don’t lend them-
selves to any sort of easy explanation in terms of “water” being ambiguous between a
‘descriptive’ and a ‘causal’ reading.
45 See, for instance, Bernecker 2010, p. 192.
46 The predictions of such an account would be largely in line with the other account that I
know of to give a plausible account of how the plurality of contents would be sorted,
namely, Goldberg’s (2005) account of what he calls “the defeat of the Current Face
Value Presumption.” Roughly put, Goldberg’s view is that a speaker’s term should be
interpreted in accordance with the meanings of his current community unless (1) the
speaker’s intentions and justiﬁcatory dispositions regarding that word support a different
interpretation, and (2) the speaker would, on becoming aware of this conﬂict with what
his current society means by the term, disavow any intention to be using the word with
that meaning, and correct his other beliefs accordingly. However, while Goldberg’s
account would make roughly the same predictions about cases (1) and (2) essentially
amount to the speaker having commitments tying his use to the original context that are
more heavily entrenched than those tying his use to his current context, it doesn’t quite
answer Bernecker’s demand for a mechanism explaining why various contents appear in
various contexts. That is to say, it describes how the semantic values may be distributed
without giving any sort of metasemantic explanation of the distribution.
47 Though it is less clear how the account can extend beyond direct memory reports, or
reports that draw on multiple memories with multiple sources.
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Externalism and inference
The understanding of the switching cases available to the metasemantic
contextualist also has the advantage of allowing one to put to rest
Boghossian’s worry that “externalism is inconsistent with very important
aspects of our intuitive conception of the mind – namely, with the a
priority of our logical abilities.”48 Given that the breakdown in the prior-
ity of our logical abilities that Boghossian’s argument focuses on seems to
turn on our apparent inability to recognize that two concepts in our
occurrent thoughts have different contents, the breakdown in our logical
abilities seems tied to a breakdown in some more intuitive sense of the
‘transparency’ of our own thoughts, and hence suggests a serious tension
between semantic externalism and our intuitive conception of self-
knowledge.49
Boghossian argues for his conclusion by considering the following
variant of the now familiar switching case: Peter is an opera fan and
inhabitant of Earth. While vacationing in New Zealand he encounters
Luciano Pavarotti swimming in Lake Taupo and, much to his delight,
has an extended conversation with the famous tenor. Some time later,
and without his knowledge, Peter is switched to Twin Earth and over a
number of years most of his terms come to take on the semantic values
standardly associated with Twin English, so that when he eventually
sees Pavarotti’s twin perform and subsequently claims that he saw
“Pavarotti” sing, he is talking about Twin Pavarotti. However, it
seems as if he can still have memory-based thoughts about the
Pavarotti on Earth, and when he reminisces about the time that he
saw ‘Pavarotti’ swimming in Lake Taupo, he seems to be thinking of
our Pavarotti, not his twin. Boghossian claims that this ability to access
both contents could, however, result in Peter’s engaging in reasoning
like the following:
(1) Pavarotti once swam in Lake Taupo.
(2) The singer I heard yesterday is Pavarotti.
(3) Therefore, the singer I heard yesterday once swam in Lake Taupo.
48 Boghossian 1992a, p. 17. Ludlow (1999) appeals to similar cases to undermine the
pluralistic or ‘conceptual addition’ interpretation of the switching cases, since this parti-
cular problem doesn’t arise for those who endorse the monistic or ‘conceptual replace-
ment’ interpretation of such cases.
49 Boghossian later cashes out the relevant sense of ‘transparency’ as: “If two of a thinker’s
token thoughts possess the same content, then the thinker must be able to know a priori
that they do; and (b) If two of a thinker’s token thoughts possess distinct contents, then
the thinker must be able to know a priori that they do” (Boghossian 2011, p. 457).
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According to Boghossian, “Pavarotti” refers to Earth’s Pavarotti in the
initial premise, but to Twin Pavarotti in the second, so that “True pre-
mises conspire, through a fallacy of equivocation that Peter is in principle
not able to notice, to produce a false conclusion.”50 What would seem to
Peter to be a perfectly valid inference would thus turn out not to be and so
“the thesis of a priority of logical abilities is . . . inconsistent with extern-
alist assumptions.”51 This is a surprising result, and it (along with its
suggestion that the identity of our concepts is not ‘transparent’ to us) is
sure to make externalism look less appealing.
However, there is reason to be suspicious of Boghossian’s claim that the
references of our terms could switch mid argument in such a fashion. In
particular, Boghossian’s argument seems to rely on something like the
‘source-dependent contextualism’ mentioned earlier,52 and thus he feels
free to ignore the fact that arguments and inferences (especially those
inferences meant to be introspectively surveyable) take place against the
background of a single context.
In particular, just because Peter might typically utter (1) in contexts
where the occurrence of “Pavarotti” refers to Pavarotti, while he typically
utters (2) in contexts where the occurrence of “Pavarotti” refers to
Pavarotti’s twin, it need not follow that the term can support multiple
semantic values in the context of an argument that involves both (1) and
(2). Indeed, the contextualist account outlined above would seem to rule
out the sorts of introspectively undetectable equivocation described by
Boghossian.53
Peter has, after all, a set of ‘Pavarotti commitments’ that are tied to two
men, and which of the two Pavarottis he refers to will depend on which
subset of his commitments carries the most weight in a given context. It
seems likely that a sentence like (1) would typically be uttered in the
context of Peter’s reminiscing about his encounter with the great tenor,
and the commitments tying the term to Pavarotti will in such cases be
more heavily weighted than those attached to his twin. (Of course, this
50 Boghossian 1992a, p. 22. (We can assume that Pavarotti’s twin never swam in either Lake
Taupo or its twin.)
51 Ibid.
52 As he puts it, “memory-beliefs involving ‘Pavarotti’ or ‘water’ or whatever, originating in
Earthly experiences, are about Pavarotti, water, and so on. And, correlatively, that
memory-beliefs involving those words originating in Twearthly experiences will be
about Twin Pavarotti, twin water, and so on” (Boghossian 1992b, p.42.)
53 Stalnaker (2008) also presents an account of these slow-switching cases that doesn’t rely
on any type of source-dependent contextualism, but his view seems to give priority to the
attributer’s context (see especially p. 131), in a way that this view does not, and thus may
be open to criticism (see, for instance, Boghossian 2011, p. 465) for taking these inten-
tional facts dependent upon other people’s intentional facts, which would, in turn, face
just the same need for interpretation.
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need not always be the case, and (1) could be uttered in contexts where
the commitments associated with Pavarotti’s twin carried more weight.)
By contrast, a sentence like (2) would be more likely uttered in contexts
where the commitments tied to Pavarotti’s twin aremore entrenched, and
in that case “Pavarotti” would refer to Pavarotti’s twin. (Though, once
again, there could be contexts where the occurrence of the name in (2)
might refer to Pavarotti as well.)
Still, while there can be contexts where “Pavarotti” refers to Pavarotti,
and other contexts where the name picks out Pavarotti’s twin, these are
clearly different contexts, and while isolated instances of either (1) and (2)
can each be true in some context, there is no context in which they are both
true. However, when (1) and (2) are incorporated into a single argument,
they have to be interpreted in terms of single contexts, and so the term will
need to be assigned a single semantic value in both (1) and (2).54
Consequently, the sorts of hidden equivocation (and corresponding fail-
ures of semantic self-knowledge) that Boghossian treats the externalist as
committed to allowing will not arise.
The view presented above allows both that (1) the thinker has access to
two “Pavarotti” contents, and (2) those two contents will never produce
an equivocation in the course of a single argument.55 Boghossian is
skeptical about the possibility of such a combination, but such skepticism
seems driven by the assumption that such a combination could only be
explained by a view (which he attributes to Burge and Schiffer)56 in which
the terms in an argument are quasi-anaphorically connected so that the
ﬁrst occurrence of a term (whose reference is determined along source-
dependent contextualist lines) itself determines what the rest of the
occurrences of that term refer to.57 On such accounts (as Boghossian
notes), the ordering of the premises would determine who the argument is
about, so that
54 See Schiffer 1992, p. 35 for a similar point and the claim that premises 1 and 2 can be
compressed into something like “Pavarotti once swam in Lake Taupo, and is the singer I
heard yesterday” where there is only one occurrence of “Pavarotti.”
55 For some others who deny that “Pavarotti” would have two distinct references in this
case, see Burge 1998, Goldberg 2007a, and Schiffer 1992.
56 Burge 1998 and Schiffer 1992. Note, however, that while Schiffer insists that “Pavarotti”
in the second premise be interpreted in the same way as it is in the ﬁrst (Schiffer 1992, p.
33), his presentation seems to leave room for the possibility that this might be a con-
sequence of the fact that whatever determines the content of one will determine the
content of the other in the context of an argument. Consequently, he doesn’t seem to
explicitly commit himself to the order of the premises determining how they are
interpreted.
57 Boghossian 2011, p. 459. For a similar argument, see Brown 2004a, pp. 177–78, and see
Bernecker 2010, p. 191, and Goldberg 2007a, p. 181 for other discussions of this sort of
‘anaphoric’ explanation of univocality within arguments.
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(1) Pavarotti once swam in Lake Taupo.
(2) The singer I heard yesterday is Pavarotti.
(3) Therefore, the singer I heard yesterday once swam in Lake Taupo.
would be a valid argument about the Pavarotti on Earth (with a false
second premise), while
(1) The singer I heard yesterday is Pavarotti.
(2) Pavarotti once swam in Lake Taupo.
(3) Therefore, the singer I heard yesterday once swam in Lake Taupo.
would be a valid argument about the Pavarotti onTwin Earth (with a false
second premise). That the ordering of premises should have such an
effect is an admittedly unappealing conclusion, but while that presents a
problem for those who respond to Boghossian’s argument with such an
appeal to quasi-anaphoric dependence, it should be clear that the sort of
metasemantic account suggested here has no such commitment. There is
no requirement that the sentence in the ﬁrst premise be weighted more
(or less) heavily than the sentence in the second premise, so while all of
the occurrences of “Pavarotti” in the argumentmust be assigned the same
value, that value is independent of the premises’ ordering.
Conclusion
The metasemantic contextualist who relies on something like the Self-
Interpretation Principle can, then, argue that a number of important
debates surrounding semantic externalism arise from the fact that both
sides mistakenly assume that there is a single answer to questions like
“What is the semantic value of ‘arthritis’ in Bert’s language?” or “What is
the content of John’s ‘water’ memories?”, when the answers to such
questions are, in fact, context-dependent. Further, while the view is
motivated by a certain conception of self-knowledge as a type of ‘author-
ity’ (that is, speakers’ own judgments determine what they mean when
their commitments conﬂict), it is able, once in place, to help answer the
threat to self-knowledge as ‘transparency’ that semantic externalism
seemed to present.
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